Things You Ought To Know About Election 2010
(This guest post comes from Earl Rosero, a volunteer of the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting. Earl is involved in preparations for the upcoming election.)
Voters who want to be well-informed of how the May 10, 2010 elections will be conducted should visit these two websites: www.comelec.gov.ph and www.bagongbontante.ph I also recommend that you visit this law website: http://www.chanrobles.com/electionlawsofthephilippines.htm
Now, here is my presentation on Poll Automation 2010 based on information culled from various publicly-available official documents and sources like those posted on the Comelec website.
Getting the Voter to Vote
First things first. The voter must get to the precinct to vote. This part of the election process poll automation is powerless to address. Intimidation, terrorism, laziness and apathy can keep voters from voting. Desperate candidates who are fairly certain of losing in a locality will use intimidation and terrorism to force voters to stay in their homes on election day. An example of such evil acts would be the burning of schools on or before election day. In places where they are popular, the desperate candidates will even transport their voters to the voting centers and bring them home. The lazy and those who don't really care about the future of our country would rather stay at home to do what they usually do on any normal day of their senseless lives.
When you go to the school or other venue that serves as a voting center, look first for your name is the list of voters and then look for the room of your precinct.. Ask the voters' assistance desks for help. The room you went to before may not be the same room you will vote at this time around.
Go to the voting center early. Do not wait for the end of voting hours (6:00pm). The sooner the voting gets done, the sooner the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) can start telling the voting machine to count the votes and print out the results. The results will be read out loud when they are first printed. The accredited watchers will be given copies of the election results. The results paper will look like an official receipt from a cash register and will be a long roll of paper because there are many positions at stake in these elections on May 10, 2010.
The Ballot
The Comelec will print 50 million ballots. There has never been an election in Philippine history with 100 percent voter turnout or even close to it. There will be more than enough ballots on election day.
The ballot is like one big lotto card. Days before election day, list down in alphabetical order (according to surname) the names of your candidates. The names of the candidates are printed in alphabetical order on the ballot. Bring that list with you when you vote.
When the BEI gives you the ballot, make sure that none of the ovals are filled up. You should have a blank ballot. If your ballot already has shadings and markings on it, do not accept that ballot and let the watchers know that you were given a pre-filled up ballot.
Just shade the blank ovals to the left of the candidates' names. Do not use your digital camera or cellphone with camera while you are voting. You are not allowed to take pictures of the ballot you are filling up or have filled up. The presumption is that you will show that picture to someone else after you leave the precinct and that someone else could be the candidate's representative who will have a nice 'token' for your perverse 'loyalty'.
Do not make any mistakes when shading the ballot. You will not be given another ballot in case you make any mistakes in shading the ovals. The Comelec's General Instructions to the BEIs says "not more than one ballot shall be issued at one time." Follow the instructions printed on the ballot. The candidates for the national posts are all on one side while the candidates for the local elections are on the reverse side. The columns are color-coded. For the party-list elections, the secrecy folder placed at the table will have a list of the candidate party-list groups and their corresponding numbers or acronym letters printed on the ballot.
After you choose your candidates, you will insert your ballot into the voting machine. The machine will scan both sides of the paper at the same time, as you feed the ballot into the machine. Do not force the ballot into the machine. Just let the machine take in the ballot. If the paper jams, you can re-insert it. Ask for the help of the BEI. If the BEI need technical help, the Comelec will have technical staff on stand-by at the voting centers.
If you are free, return to the precinct at 6pm, so you can see the voting results from your precinct. The printout of the PCOS machine, the voting results will be posted outside the precinct for everyone to see and even take pictures of.
The Voting Machine
The voting machine looks very much like a fax machine used in today's modern offices. The 'brains' of that machine are in its memory card. The BEI will have keys they will use to turn on the machine. The BEI chairman and members will also have password/codes to given them access to the machine. Operating the voting machine will be like operating an ATM unit. The anxiety some people have about the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine are unnecessary, a waste of energy and time, and confuse the public.
A much-awaited event is the release of the source code. The Poll Automation law (RA 9369) defines source code as "
I expect the candidates, political parties, cause-oriented groups, and software experts to feast on this source code. Let them study it to their hearts' content and then try to find way to break it and hack the poll automation system.
When the code is loaded into the PCOS memory card, it will not run on its own or automatically. Commands entered through the lcd keypad of the PCOS machine will run step by step commands.
Now, how can something like this be sabotaged or tampered with? Let's assume I am hired by a candidate, political party, or some other person whose future may be radically affected by the election results. I have several options. I would of course download the source code and then study it. I would try to find ways to disable or render useless as many PCOS machines as I can. I would try to intercept and steal many PCOS memory cards. I might replace PCOS memory cards with bogus ones. The bogus memory cards could have sets of instructions that will instruct the PCOS machines to tabulate the results in ways that will favor the people who hired me.
To do all these, I need to have very powerful computer with lots and lots of processing speed and capacity and a top-notch team of hackers who will try to crack the 128-bit encryption and the digital signatures programmed into the memory cards. The equipment and the team will likely have to be imported. The operation would be like a high-tech robbery of a bank. This effort would cost millions of dollars. Can I or anyone break through or go around the security measures? Remotely unlikely, but not impossible.
It is very likely that the encryption software and digital signatures are not part of the source code. Encryption codes and digital signatures are not source codes and should therefore not be released to the public. The Comelec is required to make public the source code, but not the security measures. The security measures would likely be the 'container and packaging' of the source code.
Instead of resorting to expensive, high-tech means of cheating, the cheaper way to sabotage the elections would be through intimidation, terrorism and the bombing of facilities like power plants, power transmission lines, and cell sites of mobile communications. The Comelec, media and citizens' groups should have plans to thwart these tactics.
The Transmission of Results from the Precinct
The results will be transmitted electronically to at least six receiving points: the Comelec headquarters node; the nodes for the provincial, city, and town boards of canvassers; the node for the political parties, media and PPCRV; and the back-up node of Smartmatic. This means, there will be six identical electronic copies of the results sent out from the precinct. The results in each voting machine will be stored in the machine's memory card. That memory card will have security features, including encryption and digital signatures. It will also have distinct markings to distinguish it from counterfeit ones. Those memory cards and the used, accepted ballots will be put in storage and will be used again in case of election results protests or in case there are serious problems with the electronic trans.
The results sent out from the precincts will be posted on the poll automation website. If I were the one to design the system, the computer network for the poll automation website where the results will be posted will not have a direct cable link or wireless link to any of the receiving nodes. The website computer server will be like a stand-alone computer, so hackers cannot attack it remotely. Anyone who wants to try to attack the website will have to be physically present at the server to do the hacking in person. Hence, the importance of tight security at the places where these computer systems will be located.
As has been explained by Comelec officials and Smartmatic people, the transmission time from the precinct to the Comelec node will be about two to three minutes. Given the security features used and that small window of opportunity of only two to three minutes, It will not be easy for hackers to go in to steal data, copy data, or replace the data being transmitted. The software being used to manage the transmission of data has also features that will let the system know that unauthorized intrusion is taking place. The level of security that will be used is similar in some ways to those that banks use to protect their electronic banking networks and ATM units.
The Canvassing of Votes at the Town/City/Province/National
This is where a lot of the cheating usually takes place in past elections. The top guns of candidates are fielded at the canvassing centers. Among them are lawyers and you can bet that some of them have legal tricks up their filthy sleeves.
On the night of election day, the Comelec, the political parties, the media and the PPCRV will all know who won the elections. They all have identical electronic copies of the precinct results. But at this point, those are still unofficial results because the official results will come after the canvassers have done their jobs. The country will wait for the canvassers to officially announce the winners. HOW LONG WILL WE WAIT FOR THE OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION?
The canvassers at the city/town and provincial levels will convene at 6:00pm on election day. They will use the electronically-transmitted results from the precincts. Poll watchers should have extra sharp senses during the canvassing in case any dirty tricks are used. The local canvassers can also use the data contained in the memory cards of PCOS machines, but, I suppose, this second option will be resorted to when the first option cannot be used for some sound reason.
The canvassers will electronically-transmit their certificates of canvass to the Comelec headquarters and to the Senate President. The National Board of Canvassers for the Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections will be Congress convened in joint session. The National Board of Canvassers for the Senatorial and Party-List Electons will be the Comelec en banc. These two National Boards will canvass every election return from every province, city and municipality. Their basis for the canvassing will be the eelctronically-trasmitted certificates of canvass from the local levels. RA 9369 gives Congress and the Comelec up to 30 days after election day to open the certificates of canvass and collate all the results.
Thirty days is the maximum wait but CONGRESS AND COMELEC SHOULD CONVENE AS NATIONAL BOARDS OF CANVASSERS THE DAY AFTER ELECTION DAY AND START CANVASSING THE RESULTS THAT SAME DAY.
Let us hope and pray that evil tactics will not be used to delay or stop the canvassing and proclamation of the official results.
Leave a Response
Entries(RSS)